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ADDRESSING LIABILITY AND CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT: 
A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 
JODI G. DANIEL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Health information technology (“HIT”) has the power to improve the 
delivery of health care and bring needed information to the health care 
provider at the point of care.  This includes information about the patient 
from disparate sources.  Clinical decision support (“CDS”) facilitates the use 
of this patient information, combined with medical knowledge, to support 
decision making by healthcare providers with the aim of improved quality of 
care and patient safety.  The consequences of effective CDS are far-
reaching: where does the computer’s advice become an essential 
component of clinical decision-making?  How do we maintain confidence 
that the guidance offered by the computer is aligned with best practices?  
When is it acceptable for the clinician to ignore the advice of a CDS 
intervention?  Liability concerns are a backdrop to many of these questions. 
The article by Susan Ridgely and Michael Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, 
Too Much Liability: Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-
Drug Interaction Clinical Decision Support,1 was part of the Advancing 
Clinical Decision Support initiative sponsored by the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”) at the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).  The initiative focused 
in part on the issue of “alert fatigue”–in which excessive numbers of alerts 
may result in health care providers ignoring or turning off important CDS 
functionality.2  The Ridgely and Greenberg article explores liability concerns 
raised by alert fatigue for electronic health record (“EHR”) developers and 
users.3  They have advanced the issues related to liability and drug-drug 
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 1. M. Susan Ridgely & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability: 
Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interactions Clinical Decision 
Support, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 257, 257, 259 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 259. 
 3. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
326 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:325 
interactions (“DDI”), and they have identified potential solutions.4  ONC 
funded this work; however, the authors’ statements and views do not 
represent the policies or positions of ONC. 
This response explores the role of the federal government, the proposals 
made by Ridgely and Greenberg, and a proposed way of thinking about 
liability and clinical decision support from the federal government 
perspective.   
II.  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 
The healthcare industry has been slow to adopt information technology, 
including electronic health records (“EHRs”), as compared to other 
industries, despite the call for adoption to improve health care quality.5  As 
a result, the federal government stepped in to promote adoption and 
“meaningful use”6 of HIT under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (“HITECH”) through Medicare 
and Medicaid incentive programs.7 Beginning in 2011, eligible 
professionals and hospitals that achieve meaningful use of “certified EHR 
technology”8 and complete an attestation process receive payments.9  These 
programs are led by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
in close collaboration with the ONC.10  ONC adopts standards and criteria 
for EHR technology.11 
CDS has been the subject of greater interest as HHS has moved to 
promote EHR adoption.  Among the requirements for the technology is to 
“implement automated, electronic CDS rules (in addition to drug-drug and 
drug-allergy contraindication checking) based on the data elements 
 
 4. See id. at 278. 
 5. See COMM. ON PATIENT SAFETY & HEALTH INFO. TECH., INST. OF MED., HEALTH IT AND 
PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER SYSTEMS FOR BETTER CARE, 1-2 to 1-5 (2011) [hereinafter 
HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY], available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id= 
13269&page=13. 
 6. 42 C.F.R. §§ 495.4, .6, .8 (2010); see also CMS EHR Meaningful Use Overview, 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/EHRIncentivePrograms/ 
30_Meaningful_Use.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 7. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act 
comprises Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  Particularly relevant are HITECH Act §§ 4001-4101, 4103, 
4201, 123 Stat. at 467, 470, 487. 
 8. 45 C.F.R. § 170.102. 
 9. 42 C.F.R. Parts 412, 413, 422 et al., Medicare and Medicaid Programs. Electronic 
Health Record Incentive Program Final Rule. 
 10. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 
Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,316 (July 28, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 422, 495). 
 11. 45 C.F.R. § 170 subparts B and C (2011). 
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included in: problem lists; medication lists; demographics; and laboratory 
test results.”12  For a provider or hospital to receive incentive payments, they 
must use certified EHR technology that includes this functionality and 
“implement one clinical decision support rule.”13  There also are 
requirements related to computerized provider order entry (“CPOE”) for 
medication orders and for drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks.14  
These elements are critical to the objectives of the programs as the focus is 
not only on adoption but also on meaningful use of HIT.  Many of the 
benefits of the technology are only achieved when there is intelligence built 
in to inform decisions and when health care providers use this intelligence to 
improve health care delivery and patient outcomes.  “If implemented 
correctly, alerts can improve patient safety.”15  Therefore, effective CDS is an 
important component of EHRs and critical to effectuate meaningful use.16  
Medication-related CDS that includes a DDI list is an important tool to 
reduce adverse drug events. 
In general, the federal government has an important, but limited, role in 
influencing the market, and acts when there is a legitimate public purpose 
and authority for doing so.  The federal government has intervened for the 
following reasons, among others: (1) market forces are not producing an 
outcome that is of widespread public benefit; (2) a market failure is allowing 
persistent inefficiencies; (3) it is more efficient for the government than the 
private sector to act to address a public need; or (4) it is necessary to 
protect the public.  While in some cases it is appropriate for the government 
to step in to address these types of concerns, it is prudent to limit such 
intervention to no more than that which is necessary to address the problem.  
Many efforts currently underway involve leveraging public-private 
partnerships to develop the appropriate balance between government and 
the private sector.17 
In the case of CDS and liability, there seem to be appropriate roles that 
the federal government may take because of its interest in consumer 
protection and a failure of the market to address this concern.  As Ridgely 
and Greenberg point out, the research shows that adoption of CDS, 
including clinical alerts, appears to reduce the rates of adverse drug 
 
 12. 45 C.F.R. § 170.304(e) and § 170.306(c) (2011). 
 13. 42 C.F.R. § 495.6(d)(11)(ii), (f)(10)(ii) (2010). 
 14. 45 C.F.R. § 170.302(a) (2011). 
 15. HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 2-10. 
 16. Id. at 2-9. 
 17. See, e.g., Public Private Partnership Tools, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/private 
sector/ppp_tools.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (encouraging public private partnerships); 
see Partnership Provides Health IT Training and Electronic Health Records, THE OFF. OF 
MINORITY HEALTH, http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/content.aspx?lvl=1&lvlID=46&ID 
=9241(last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
328 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:325 
events.18  They also argue that concerns about liability and CDS may result 
in risk avoidance behaviors of various players.19  If the CDS is designed in a 
way that causes users to ignore interventions because they are too often 
irrelevant and unhelpful, then there are two unintended consequences.  
First, patients who could have been helped by information provided through 
this technology are not helped, and medical errors that could have been 
avoided are not avoided.  ONC has an interest in alert fatigue because of 
its interest in using HIT to improve healthcare outcomes.  Second, as Ridgely 
and Greenberg describe, health care providers who ignore interventions 
may be faced with a new source of liability risk if it can be shown that the 
interventions could have prevented injuries.20  This is important to ONC 
because the fear of increased liability–even if unfounded–has been raised as 
a concern by health care providers21 and may impact adoption of EHRs.  
Ridgely and Greenberg researched a specific kind of CDS (alerts) in a 
specific domain (drug-drug interactions).22  It is not clear, however, that their 
findings generalize to all types of CDS.  Osheroff and colleagues define ten 
types of CDS.23  Ridgely and Greenberg’s focus on just one of these types of 
CDS intervention, without consideration of the others, limits their analysis 
and their conclusions. 
In the case of DDI alerts and liability, the market has not developed a 
solution for the liability risk.  This failure impedes quality and safety 
improvements in health care. Ridgely and Greenberg note that “the HIT 
vendor market has not produced a solution to over-inclusive DDI warnings, 
 
 18. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 261. 
 19. Id. at 262. 
 20. Id. at 268. 
 21. American Health Information Community (AHIC), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&mode=2&cached=true&objID 
=1199&PageID=15512 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012); Electronic Health Records Workgroup, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/ server.pt/community/ 
ahic_workgroups/1201/electronic_health_records/15527 (last visited January 29, 2012); 
AHIC Workgroups, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/ 
server.pt/community/ahic_workgroups/1201/home/15523; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., THE COMMUNITY: AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION COMMUNITY 14, 23 (2008). 
 22. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 257. 
 23. JEROME A. OSHEROFF ET AL., IMPROVING OUTCOMES AND CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT: 
AN IMPLEMENTER’S GUIDE (2011). CDS during data-entry tasks (Smart Documentation Forms, 
Order Sets, Care Plans and Protocols, Parameter Guidance, Critiques and Warnings – 
“Immediate Alerts”), CDS during data-review tasks (Relevant Data Summaries (Single-patient), 
Multi-patient Monitors, Predictive and Retrospective Analytics), CDS during assessment and 
understanding tasks (Filtered Reference Information and Knowledge Resources, Expert Workup 
and Management Advisors), CDS not triggered by a user task (Event-driven Alerts (Data-
triggered) and Reminders (Time-triggered)). 
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or to the well-documented problem of physician alert fatigue.”24  They assert 
that vendors and presumably content developers are “creating CDS systems 
that generate massively over-inclusive automated warnings” and then using 
contract terms to shift liability for the use of the EHR to the users without 
regard for the possible vendor contribution to alert fatigue.25  
Indemnification clauses, disclaimers, and limitations on damages that 
reduce the vendor’s liability for alert fatigue are common EHR contract 
terms.  The authors suggest, but do not fully explore, how these contract 
terms may reduce the need for the EHR vendors to find solutions for the 
problem of alert fatigue by relieving them of liability for their own poor 
design or poor content.  This point deserves additional policy consideration.  
The policy problem raised by concerns of liability for CDS is not the 
potential for liability itself but that the fear of liability will negatively impact 
design, clinical content, EHR adoption, and EHR implementation. 
In Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care, 
commissioned by ONC, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) highlights broader 
safety risks and asserts that HHS should work with a variety of stakeholders 
to mitigate the risks and make HIT-enabled care safer. 26  In this report, 
IOM provided a set of recommendations, which HHS is currently evaluating 
as it develops a safety plan.27  The issue of alert fatigue and the potential 
impact on patient safety may appropriately be considered in this plan. 
III.  PROPOSED STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES 
Given the primacy of health care quality and patient safety, the goal 
should be to figure out how to improve the likelihood that the most 
important CDS interventions are viewed and considered by clinicians.  There 
are a number of players that are potentially liable if there is a problem with 
CDS or if it is not viewed or used: software designers, the providers of the 
medical knowledge used by the system, and the end users, i.e., the health 
care providers.  Each of these players is likely to make decisions to minimize 
its risk of liability.  However, actions based on risk avoidance do not 
necessarily result in the best and safest care for the patient. 
The first strategy proposed by Ridgely and Greenberg is the creation of a 
standard for the content of a particular form of alert—the creation of a DDI 
list.28  Three of the other strategies involve mechanisms to endorse this list 
through various policies.29  The second recommendation is for regulation of 
 
 24. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 259. 
 25. Id. at 262. 
 26. See HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at S-2, 6-3 to 6-5. 
 27. Id. at 6-11 to 6-13. 
 28. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 279. 
 29. Id. at 286, 289-90. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:325 
CDS tools by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).30  This would be 
oversight of both the content and design of CDS. 
I agree with the authors that consensus on a clinically significant DDI list 
could help address problems of liability.  However, I also agree with the 
authors that achieving and maintaining such a consensus would likely be 
challenging.31  It would be very challenging to develop and maintain 
standard content for CDS, and DDI specifically, as medical knowledge 
changes rapidly.  In the case of the creation and maintenance of a DDI list, 
it is likely that the creation is best done by experts in the field, not the federal 
government. As they state, it requires finding a willing group of 
organizations to take on such an effort and to develop a system for updating 
the list over time.32  They note that this would likely require government 
involvement and funding, which may be challenging in the current economic 
environment. 33  This is only exacerbated by the fact that it would be difficult 
to obtain consensus on a common DDI list, and creating and maintaining 
such a list would likely be time consuming and expensive.  In addition, the 
emergence of personalized medicine means that there will be increasing 
complexity of information regarding drug interactions in relation to genetic 
profiles further complicating the creation of a DDI list.34 
The second approach, FDA oversight of CDS as a device, may address 
concerns of liability, but raises other challenges.  The IOM report highlights 
that the safety and improvements in care that can be delivered through HIT 
require considerations of the socio-technical system in which the EHR 
operates.35  This includes considering not just the technology, but also the 
people, processes, organizations, and external environments.36 For 
example, even if the technology has the right information in it, the way it is 
implemented, or the processes for use can impact its effectiveness.  
Therefore, regulating the technology may address the liability issue up to a 
point, but may not necessarily solve the safety and effectiveness problem.  In 
addition, in a market that is emerging and changing rapidly, such as HIT, 
there have been concerns raised about the appropriate balance of 
government oversight and market innovation.37  Regulation may add 
complexity and delays in updating and maintaining products as knowledge 
changes.  The IOM considered the role of FDA oversight of HIT from a 
 
 30. Id. at 281. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 281. 
 34. Wolfgang Sadée & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized 
Medicine, 14 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 207, 207, 210 (2005). 
 35. See HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 3-2 to 3-4. 
 36. Id. at 3-3 to 3-4. 
 37. Id. at 6-12. 
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safety perspective.38  They were concerned that the “FDA framework is 
oriented toward conventional, out-of-the-box, turnkey devices” and that 
such oversight may stifle innovation.39  They specifically recommended that 
the FDA not regulate at this time, but recommended re-evaluating this 
position if other mechanisms for safety prove ineffective.40  Given the IOM’s 
recommendations, it is unlikely that the FDA will, in the short run, actively 
regulate CDS as a medical device using its existing authority.  However, 
software developers may be well advised, from a liability perspective, to 
consider certain FDA guidance and regulations, including human factors 
guidance, and pending guidance from ONC regarding quality management 
best practices, as reflecting a developed federal standard. 
IV.  NEW STRATEGIES TO CONSIDER AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
Ridgely and Greenberg provide evidence of a problem, whereby fears of 
liability result in DDI alerts (and arguably CDS) that may not support 
providers in delivering the best care to patients, and therefore, of a need for 
solutions to address the problem.41  There is also a valid basis for the 
federal government to take steps to address this problem in order to support 
improved clinical care and meaningful use of EHR. It is best for the 
government action to be limited to that which is necessary to address the 
failure or need that exists.  There may be opportunities for federal 
government involvement to support the solution that is less heavy-handed, 
with fewer potential unintended consequences.  These approaches include 
focusing on user-centered design and collaborating with public and private 
stakeholders to understand and address concerns and actions that are 
counter to safety goals. 
First, it would be valuable to consider some creative solutions to the 
problem of DDI alert fatigue, which results from conservative, risk-averse 
behavior on the part of the relevant players.  Human computer interaction 
research, i.e., human factors research and user-centered design, could 
provide helpful lessons for DDI alerts and CDS more broadly.  The National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has released an EHR 
Usability Protocol (“EUP”) identifying alert fatigue as a usability problem.42  
The IOM recommended that HHS specify the “quality management 
 
 38. Id. at S-9. 
 39. Id. at S-10. 
 40. HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at S-10. 
 41. Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 262. 
 42. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NISTIR 7804, 
TECHNICAL EVALUATION, TESTING AND VALIDATION OF THE USABILITY OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
RECORDS (2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/usability/upload/EUP_WERB_ 
Version_2_23_12-Final-2.pdf. 
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principles” that HIT vendors must adopt, with a particular focus on human 
factors, safety culture, and usability.”43  There may be opportunities to 
design systems that provide the most relevant support to health care 
providers without over-inclusive alerts.  Ridgely and Greenberg consider the 
DDI alerting challenges, which is only one aspect of the expansive domain 
that CDS encompasses.44  For example, while CDS can involve “pop-up” 
alerts or messages, it may also be instantiated as the prioritization of various 
selections to make the preferred choice more prevalent, or pre-selecting 
drugs or procedures in an order set that are most consistent with 
guidelines.45  Effective CDS involves using design to affect provider 
decision-making that improves care and outcomes.  The federal government 
can play a role in promoting user-centered design that focuses on areas of 
patient safety, particularly with respect to CDS.  This may result in effective 
CDS that does not lead to alert fatigue. 
Second, we should consider directly addressing the problems of liability, 
or fear of liability.  It would be valuable to look at the issues of contracting 
to determine if there are ways to align liability risks with the party most able 
to mitigate the risks.  It would also be valuable to determine if there are 
ways of setting guidelines to establish a reasonable process for developing 
CDS in order to minimize the risks to those assuming them.  An effective way 
for determining a solution to this complex problem with a variety of 
stakeholders with different incentives is to bring together the stakeholders–
including the clinical knowledge providers, the EHR vendors, the health care 
providers and systems, malpractice insurers, and other liability insurers–to 
develop approaches and options that would work together to manage risk 
for all while focusing on improving patient safety and outcomes.  The best 
solutions may only emerge when all of the relevant players work together to 
identify solutions and the entities that are best suited to implement those 
solutions.  The federal government may play a valuable role in bringing a 
focus to this issue, helping to convene stakeholders, and collaborating with 
stakeholders to develop solutions or to set mutually agreed to guidelines. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ridgely and Greenberg have done a great service in describing the 
liability risks borne by physicians, hospitals, other health care organizations, 
and EHR software vendors and clinical knowledge providers as well as the 
 
 43. HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 5, at 6-19. 
 44. See generally Ridgely & Greenberg, supra note 1. 
 45. Adam Wright et al., Development and Evaluation of a Comprehensive Clinical 
Decision Support Taxonomy: Comparison of Front-End Tools in Commercial and Internally 
Developed Electronic Health Record Systems, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 232, 237, 
239 (2011). 
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impact on DDI lists and CDS.  Their determination that there is very little 
actual liability related to drug-drug interaction software should reduce 
defensiveness and encourage a dialogue about solutions to the problem of 
alert fatigue.  Patient safety and the reduction of medical errors should be 
the focus of concern.  It is critical that we create a culture of safety that 
promotes actions that support patient safety.  ONC looks forward to 
fostering and participating in that dialogue. 
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